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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT
INDIVIDUALS
The Supreme Court of Utah has recently asserted the
right of Utah Courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
non-resident individuals conducting business within the state
through agents. While such a power has long existed over
non-resident corporations, the Supreme Court of the United
States has held it not to exist where the nonresident is an
individual., But there is every indication that the sounder
view expressed by the Utah court will prevail in the future.
Morris Wein, a resident of California, owned a road-
house in Utah which he operated locally through an agent. A
building contractor residing in Utah commenced a contract
action against Wein for costs of construction of the building
by serving process on the local agent in compliance with a
Utah statute.2 Wein appeared especially, denying the consti-
tutionality of the statute under the due process provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 In recalling a writ of prohibi-
tion, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the statute as an exer-
cise of the police power; finding it reasonable that nonresi-
dent individuals be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
state in which they conduct business through local agents.
Wein v. Crockett, Utah, 195 P.2d 222 (1948).
1. Rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States as to juris-
diction over nonresidents are binding upon the states. If a judgment is
rendered in one state and an action is brought thereon in another state,
a federal question is involved under the provisions of Article IV, § 1,
that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the proceedings
of every other state." Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 214 U. S.
8 (1907). The enforcement of a judgment against a defendant over
whom the court has no jurisdiction involves a violation of the provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." Riverside, etc.
Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 (1915).
2. Laws of Utah 1947, c. 10 § 2 provides that "when a non-resident
person is associated in and conducts business within the State of Utah
under the supervision of an agent, said person may be sued on any
action arising out of the conduct of said business ..., and the summons
in such cases may be served.., upon his agent."
Some states have enacted statutes requiring less than "doing busi-
ness." E.g., IND. STAT. ANN (Burns Repl. 1948) § 25-316 (nonresident
corporations); Ark. Acts 1947, No. 347, § 2 (nonresident individuals).
3. U. S. CONST. ALiEND. XIV, § 1.
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The common law requirements for personal jurisdiction,
resting primarily upon actual presence4 and consent, have not
prevented state courts from assuming jurisdiction over foreign
corporations which enter and do business within the state.
In satisfying these requirements, the courts have said that
the corporation impliedly consents to jurisdiction," the con-
sent being derived from the power of the state to exclude a
foreign corporation from doing business within its borders.6
By another rationalization the courts have found that a cor-
poration doing business within a state manifests its presence
there for purposes of jurisdiction.7  Recently, however, in
International Shoe v. Washington," the Supreme Court of the
United States broke sharply from these ficticious explana-
tions. Due process, the court said, requires only that there
be adequate notice machinery" and certain minimum contacts
with the state of the forum to render the maintenance of the
suit inoffensive to traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. 0
4. For a discussion of the shift away from this physical power as
the foundation of personal jurisdiction see Ross, The Shifting Basis of
Jurisdiction, 17 MINN. L. REv. 146 (1932).
5. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U. S. 1855).
6. Since a foreign corporation may be compelled to fulfill conditions
before entering into business within a state, by doing business within
another state it must be taken to assent to the condition upon which
alone such business could be transacted by them, i.e., that the corpora-
tion's agent conducting the business be an agent to receive service of
process. Id. at 408.
7. E.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ky., 234 U. S. 579, 589(1914). This fictional presence is hard to reconcile with Chief Justice
Taney's famous dictum that a corporation can have no legal existence
out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839).
8. 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
9. In the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents, the
particular form of substituted service adopted must give reasonable
assurance that the notice will be actual. Reasonable assurance seems
satisfied if provisions are made for service upon an actual agent of
the nonresident. Doherty v. Goodman, 218 U. S. 623 (1935); or if
provisions are made for service upon a state official plus a
requirement that the official send notice to defendant by registered mail,
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
10. 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945). The International Shoe case was
not the first to suggest that a valid assumption of jurisdiction need only
conform to due process standards of reasonableness. See Hutchinson v.
Chase and Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). Judge Learned
Hand has interpreted International Shoe v. Washington as holding that
in order to determine jurisdiction "the court must balance the conflicting
interests involved; i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff in retaining the
action where it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the defendant;
or vice versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from the
issue of forum non conveniens," Kitpatrick v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co.,
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In contrast to the foreign corporations cases, there has
been some doubt as to the constitutionality of statutes pro-
viding for personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals
doing business within the state. The assertion of such power
was prohibited by the Supreme Court in Flexner v. Farsonw1
on the theory that nonresident individuals, unlike foreign cor-
porations, could not be denied the right to do business within
the state without contravening the privileges and immunities
clause of the Federal Constitution.12 This reliance upon the
power of exclusion ignored earlier Supreme Court decisions
recognizing state jurisdiction over foreign corporations which
were non-excludable because engaged in interstate commerce.1,3
The Court, in subsequent cases, has indicated a greater will-
ingness to recognize that the same considerations should
apply to corporations and individuals. Hess v. Pawloski'4
held that a state may, under its power to regulate for public
safety, provide for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
operating motor vehicles in the state.15 Under a "doing busi-
ness" statute,6 Doherty v. Goodman7 upheld personal juris-
diction over a nonresident selling securities in the state
through agents. The scope of the decision, however, was
166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U. S. 814 (1948). Under
this related doctrine of forum non conveniens courts of equity and of law
occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction,
where . . . "the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a
foreign tribunal." Brandeis, T., in Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
Steamships, 285 U. S. 413, 423 (1932).
11. 248 U. S. 289 (1919).
12. U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 2; U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
13. In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 588
(1914) the Supreme Court found foreign corporations subject to juris-
diction because they are within the state, receiving the protection of its
laws, and may, and often do, have large properties located within the
state.
14. 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
15. The statute as well as the decision limited jurisdiction to causes
of action arising on highways within the state. Id. at 356. While the
decision seemed to rest upon the power of a state to exclude nonresidents
from the use of the highways as well as the power of a state to make
and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care by those
who use the highways, upon the basis of the authority cited, it is more
reasonable to base the decision on the latter ground. Culp, Process in
Actions Against Nontresident Motorists, 32 MicH. L. Rnv. 325, 329
(1934).
16. The statute was much like Utah's, conferring jurisdiction irres-
pective of the type of business the nonresident engaged in. For a dis-
cussion of the different types of nonresident service statutes see NEw
YORK LAW REVIsIoN CO1MISSION REPORTS, 136 et seq. (1940).
17. 218 U. S. 623 (1935).
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severely limited by the court's dependence on past state regu-
lation of the securities business. 8 Both cases employed a
fictional consent to jurisdiction, wrung from the power of
the state to regulate, and both seemed to limit their applica-
tion to acts especially frought with danger and economic harm
to the general public.
The significance of Wein v. Crockett is its extension of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals to a posi-
tion that is beyond the confining limit of Hess and Doherty
and is directly opposed to the stand in Flexner v. Farson.19
Utah, the court said, may exercise jurisdiction no matter
what type of business is engaged in by the nonresident. A
statute providing for such power meets the usual due process
requirements, it was further explained, because it is reason-
able that a nonresident conducting business in the state should
defend locally any action growing out of that business. Not
only will the local law usually govern the action and witnesses
be more readily available in the local state, but to compel the
plaintiff to seek out his creditor elsewhere may virtually
destroy the value of his remedy. The result can hardly be
questioned in the light of the extensive power of states today
to regulate for public convenience or general prosperity as
well as for health, safety, and morals.20
18. Accord, Condon v. Snipes, 38 So.2d 752 (1949). Cf. Suggs v.
Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944) (jurisdiction found under a
general statute relating to all business because the state had the power
to regulate the particular business in question, even though the power
remained unexercised).
19. Virtually the same result has been reached before. Stoner v.
Higginson et al. 316 Pa. 481, 175 Atl. 527 (1934) (decided before Doherty
v. Goodman supra note 17) ; Melvin Pine and Co. v. McConnell, 298 N. Y.
27, 80 N.E.2d 137 (1948) (constitutionality of statute not raised);
accord, Rauber.v. Whitney, 125 Ind. 216, 25 N. E. 186 (1890); State ex
re'el. Cook et al. v. Dist. Ct. 102 Mont. 424, 58 P.2d 273 (1936) ; Condon v.
Snipes supra note 18; see Interchemical Corp. v. Mirabelli et al. 54 N.
Y. S.2d 522, 525-527, 269 App. Div. 224 (1945); Gillioz v. Kincannon,
213 Ark. 1010, 1014, 214 S. W.2T 212, 214 (1948); Kaffenberger et al.
v. Kremer ot al., 63 F. Supp. 924, 926 (E. D. Pa. 1945); cf. Dubin v.
City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938) (ownership of property
within the state confers personal jurisdiction).
20. In speaking of statutes providing for substituted service on
agents of nonresident individuals doing business within the state Pro-
fessor Scott has said, "a state may then, in the exercise of its police
power, impose reasonable conditions upon nonresidents wishing to do
acts within the state. The mere fact that the state may not prevent the
doing of such acts does not preclude it from imposing such conditions.
The police power is not confined to regulations of public health, morals,
safety, and the like. It embraces regulations designed to promote public
convenience or the general prosperity or welfare ... and it would seem
that it is as easy to apply the doctrine of implied consent to an individual
586 [Vol. 24
RECENT CASES
But almost as impressive as the result reached in Wein
v. Crockett was the failure of the Utah court to mention or
rely upon the supporting authority of International Shoe v.
Washington. While that case involved a foreign corporation,
the broad sweep of the court's reasoning invites the applica-
tion of identical criteria in determining the exercise of juris-
diction over both corporations and individuals.21 Rejected as
determinative of jurisdiction were fictional consent, fictional
presence, and the power to exclude-the very bases of former
distinctions between the two situations; distinctions which
are predicated upon no apparent realistic considerations. The
two cases, however, are not dissimilar in their approach. Con-
ceding minor differences, both the Utah case and International
Shoe made "convenience" the determinative factor of juris-
diction rather than employing narrow interpretations of the
police power.2 2 The doctrinal shortcoming of Wein v. Crockett
is that it overcame the greatest obstacles, then failed to take
the additional step of applying International Shoe and merg-
ing the corporate and individual cases under a common au-
thority.
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION - COMPULSORY VOICE EXHIBITION
Taylor, under arrest for rape, and four other men of
the same general appearance were compelled by the sheriff
nonresident as to a foreign corporation. If the mere fact that a corpora-
tion does business within a state constitutes a consent to the conditions
which the state may properly and does impose, it is hard to see why the
doing of business by an individual is not a consent to the conditions
which a state may properly and does impose." Scott, Business Jurisdic-
tion over Nonresidents, 32 HARV. L. RE-. 871, 886 et. seq. (1919).
21. In the International Shoe case, Chief Justice Stone spoke of
individuals as well as corporations as he said, "historically the jurisdic-
tion of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their defacto power over the defendant's person .... But now.., due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantialjustice.'"
22. The main difficulty with the new approach seems to lie in the
vagueness of the terms "fair play," "substantial justice," and " minimum
contacts" utilized in International Shoe v. Washington. The problem,
however, is not wholly unique. For almost a century British courts have
been applying with success similar tests in determining the propriety of
in peraonam jurisdiction in actions against out-of-state defendants. See
Note: British Precedents far Due Process Limitations on In Personarm
Jurisdiction, 48 Cor. L. REv. 605 (1948).
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